Cornell Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 4 June 1942

Article 8

Romance of Myths Legal and Non-Legal
Herbert D. Laube

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Herbert D. Laube, Romance of Myths Legal and Non-Legal, 27 Cornell L. Rev. 541 (1942)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol27/iss4/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

THE ROMANCE OF MYTHS, LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL
HERBERT

D.

LAUBE

"The Quest for Law" is an enticing title to give to a book which deals with
the origin, growth, and function of law in human society.' The lure of its
title gives promise to the reader that the romance of adventure lies before
him. The glowing praise of this book by professional men in anthropology,
in law, in political science, and in sociology heightens the anticipation of that
promise. A quest through thousands of' years of human experience2 ought
not to leave the adventurer at "the end of the legal rainbow" so disillusioned
as does this volume. Yet the publishers hail The Quest for Law as "the most
authoritative work in its field."
The author of The Quest for Law is a practicing attorney. He is a graduate
of the College of the City of New York and of Columbia Law School. He
has served as senior attorney for the Petroleum Labor Policy Board, as a
trial examiner for the National Labor Relations Board, and as assistant solicitor
in the Department of Interior. He belongs to the "myth school" of thought.
To him, the myth of myths seems to be "Justice According to Law." Here
is one of the fairy tales the author has to tell. "The shortcomings of the administration of justice are implicit in the
very ideal of 'justice according to law.' There would be no exaltation of
legality if it had a less tenuous hold. The 'rule of law' would not seem
to be collapsing if its foundations had been stronger. In the quest for
justice according to law humanity has been seeking desperately to lift
itself by its bootstraps. * * * 4The waging of the judicial duel has never
brought anything but despair.
"It is wrong to speak of the collapse of 'law' in the present world. What
is collapsing is the dogma of 'justice according to law.' Law exists in its
most unmistakable form when there are no limitations upon power.
Jurisprudentially the edict of the tyrant, absolute monarch, or dictator is
law. It is only in the democratic imagination that law is synonymous
with the limitation of power.5 * * *
"There have been new forms of law, new legal orders. But the
'purpose' they served was only to establish new relations of power and
dominance. They recorded only the triumph of another class. 6
"Only yesterday the orthodox legal historian, whose mind is dominated
by the Anglo-centric conception of history and the cult of the common
'THE QUEST FOR LAW. WILLIAM SEAGLE. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1941. Pp.
xv, 439, xvii.
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SConclusion, p. 370.
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law, would have- summed up confidently by declaring in a classic' phrase,
commonly betokening the goal of the law's evolution, that men were
assured at least of 'justice according to law.'
The democratic imagination has produced our myth of law. The real law
is absolute law, the edict of the tyrant. Life under law in America has been
merely a delusion. If the reader were to read the concluding chapter before
reading the book in the conventional manner, he would be aware. that the
author's learning and the fatuous lure of language were only to lead him to
disillusionment. The bias of the book has been too frequently exemplified
in recent legal literature. The reader will probably lay down this book with
the conviction that the lawyer is a parasite and the law is a snare, so far as an
attorney is able to induce that conviction by his mh-making art. Let the
author speak for himself.
"The dullness of particular rules of law is less apparent perhaps than their
futility."' 8 The impossibility of coping with rules of law has driven some
writers to the extreme of almost ignoring them altogether. 9 Archaic societies
were more fortunate than we are because there was still no professional class
of jurists and lawyers to help judges.play with words, as children play with
toys. 10 With the triumph of free capitalism in the nineteenth century, the
lawyer emerged as a servant and protector of private interests to an extent
never true before. In the heydey of free competition, it seemed almost as i'f
the client existed for the sake of the lawyer."' The nobility of advocacy has
12
been tarnished by the low estate .to which the whole profession has fallen.
The persuasive "explanation" of common law pleading is the desire of the
early lawyers to promote litigation and to make something of a mystery of
their craft.' 3 In mature legal systems, to counteract the influence of the professional legal class, stress is placed upon lay participation to escape some
of the effects of a highly complex judicial duel.' 4 "Jurists match precedents
as boys match pennies."',
"As a matter of fact, the glorification of the rule of law is only an attempt
on the part of those initiated in the legal mysteries to conceal from the vulgar
the lamentable fact that particular rules of law are fluid, changing and unsettled."' 6 In this pronouncement, the author achieves the depths of his
"7
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platitudinous adventure in mythological muckraking. Compare with it, the
classic excellence of Pound's finer perspective: "Law must be stable and yet
it cannot stand still."'17 The author's tirade continues: The spirit of legalism
has but a feeble existence in the absence of the judicial duel. The criminal
law is merely an efficient instrument of class domination which became
imperative with the progress of forms of capitalistic enterprise.' 8 Tradesmen
and shopkeepers are not particularly bloodthirsty when they are prosperous;
when they desired legal security for themselves they had to assure it to all
classes.' 9 Great emphasis is placed upon the doctrine of intent in modern
criminal law with good reason. "The equalitarian criminal law, having become
necessary for the
judicialized to a far greater degree than ever before, it i's
dominant class to have some avenue of escape in certain circumstances, and
this is provided in the element of intention. The millionaire drunken driver
who kills the pedestrian has to be able to show that it was just an accidentthat is, that his intention was innocent. But crimes against persons outrage
'20
everybody, and it is difficult to escape by such a plea."
"The most significant and revealing feature of the classic penal codes will
easily escape the casual reader. * * * The overshadowing penalty is imprisonment. * * * Only in the period of Enlightenment did it emerge as the primary
penalty. It-seemed more 'humane,' although it was actually a frightfully cruel
penalty. * * * But above all it reflected well the basic value and concepts of
the triumphant bourgeois economic system. The maxim Nulla poena sine lege
was only another way of saying that every penalty must have its fixed price." 21
Since the penalty of the classic penal code is a price, the btrgaining process
in the judicial duel became a dominant feature. "But the genius of the modem
criminal law is the publfc prosecutor. The civil law is judge-made, the
criminal law is prosecutor-made. * * * To him the criminal law is only a
well-stocked arsenal of lethal weapons" for use against the enemies of the
state. Some of these are classified as "radicals," "troublemakers," and "labor
agitators"; against these the prosecutor has his "blunderbusses." "These
consist of vague crimes as 'disorderly conduct,' 'crimes against public morals,'
and the like, and they are guaranteed to lay low almost anybody."'
17

POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) 1.
18P. 231.
19P. 240.
20p. 241.
"There is seldom any difficulty in finding a purpose or end of an act. From time
immemorial the law courts have taken into consideration the 'intent' of criminals and
others, and on the whole successfully *** " HOMANS AND CURTIS, AN INTRODUCTION
TO PARETO, His SOCIOLOGY (1934) 70.
21p. 243.
22p. 247.
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"The legal obligation rested upon a 'bond of law.' Law really to flourish
required a vinculum. * * * Here is indeed rich opportunity for disputes, and
disputes are the very life of the law. * * * To be sure, if most promises were
broken, economic life could not go on, but the law can feed mightily and
lawyers wax fat on even a small percentage of shattered promises."''
The
natural law economists wanted promises enforced because they wanted the
market to be free. The jurist kept pace with the economist, and the
mechanism of the market gave juristic persons the fine opportunity that
liberty of contract afforded. Inevitably, there reigned supreme in the
nineteenth century the "maximum of individual self-assertion" through the
philosophical shortcomings of the metaphysical jurists under the felicitous
caption of "will jurisprudence."''
Through contract worship came the
perpetuation of American slavery. "There was no god but Contract, and
Sir Henry Maine was its prophet." 25 It cast its shadow upon economics,
law, and politics. The reign of law has been achieved in the United States,
'26
"the land of the free, the classic haven of repressive contract.
The author's bias, as well as the defect of his judgment, is most finely
revealed in his discussion of the socialization of private law in the last quarter
of a century. The "dark suspicion" which he attributes to Maine is probably
the product of his wishful imagination. To call "the movement for socialization of private law" a compromise with socialism is too crude for criticism.
To identify socialistic doctrine with the socialization of law is sheer verbalism,
which is generally indulged in only by economic bourbons. It is excellent
propaganda; but strangely enough, it gives basis to the popular antipathy for
socialism that has been an obstructive factor in the socialization of law.
"Even Maine had a dark suspicion that the triumph of contract might
last for less than eternity. He had said, it must be recalled, that the movement of progressive societies had hitherto been a movement from status
to contract. Did he himself envisage a cyclical movement, and are those
who have been his critics unjust? As a matter of fact Maine might have
been much bolder. A complete destruction of contract, a return to
relations reminiscent of status upon a higher plane, would have required
an acceptance of socialism.2 7 But few, jurists, judges, legislators, or
23P. 265.
24P. 266.

25P. 267.

274.
The author comments on Pound's "minor classic" on the "Liberty of Contract," which
appeared in the YALE LAw JOURNAL. "Yet despite its celebrity this article is perhaps the
most unrealistic analysis of a constitutional decision ever to have been written, for the
'error' of the judges is discussed entirely in terms of ideological preconceptions such as
higher-law doctrine, common-law tradition, etc." P. 417, n. 30.
27"The socialist finds the causes of the ills of society only in those variables in that
state of mutual dependency which he wishes to change-that is 'capitalism."' HOMANS
AND CURTIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO PARET0, His SocIOLoGY (1934) 34.
26p.

1942]

MYTHS, LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL

cabinet ministers are given to socialism. Thus the movement which has
somewhat undermined contract has been the movement known as 'the
movement for the socialization of private law,' which is to say that at most
the legislators have only compromised with 2socialism,
and curtailed only
8
the worst excesses of freedom of contract."
Codification was the new and strange delusion which beset the age of
Enlightenment.2 9 The power of the author to be on both sides of a question
at once is well exemplified in his use of emotive language. By some Paretian
refuge one could probably justify calling a delusion an historical necessity.
To achieve any unification of law through codification is a realistic triumph
that could scarcely be said to have its origin solely in delusion, however disappointed some of the expectations of codification may have been. To categorize so uncritically is to be perverse. Of course, it must be admitted,
language is quite befogging at tiimes. That does not justify the liberty some
writers exercise in its use.
"This delusion, in brief, was that the problems of the administration
of justice current at the time could all be solved simply by reducing the
law to a set of rules set forth in a code. The subsequent course of legal
history has shown this delusion to be singularly pathetic. It has, indeed,
been productive of more ironies and comic incidents than any of the other
delusions of philosophers, statesmen, and jurists. But although the merits
of codification have been debated ever since the Enlightenment, the debate
has always been idle, for codification in Europe was virtually a historical
necessity." 30
Of course, to the author, the jurists and judges were chiefly responsible for
destroying faith in law as codified; they were assisted by the commentators.
"Humanity learns but slowly. The modern codes have not prevented
the perpetual refinement of the conditions of the judicial duel any more
than did the ancient. Indeed, we are worse off, since we have not only
judges, but an unmatched plethora of lawyers, law professors, and textbook-writers. The codes might well never have been written so far as
the attempt to escape from the men of law is concerned." 1
The state of arrested development in which the law finds itself is due to the
fact that judges have fixed the conditions of the judicial duel.3 2 It is easy for
the hard-boiled lawyer to "convince himself that there is some judicial formula
that excludes the dictates of common sense and common humanity." May not
this produce a revolution? No.
272.
277.
30P. 277.
31p. 298.
32p. 317.
28p.
29p.
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"It might be supposed that the tremendous strain to which judicial
review has been subjected would cause its rapid collapse. But while the
injection of legality into the solution of political questions has created a
perpetual state of tension, it has also provided means for easing the strain,
and preventing the breaking-point from being reached. The advantage
of a court in disposing of social and economic issues is that in the
judicial forum the conflict of classes is supposed to be reconciled under
the highest ideals of objectivity." 33
What is it that makes it possible for the judges to stand an incredible amount
of abuse and villification? It is "the halo" which surrounds them. This is
probably one of the non-legal myths of the author. At least, it reveals the
unreliability of his imagination. The Supreme Court i's "an integral part of
the most adroit political system ever devised to frustrate the popular will."'3 4
The system has enabled them "to make themselves dictators of American
political life."3 The author contributes little on this score to what Beard: said
a generation ago.30 Indeed, the surprise isthat Franklin D. Roosevelt, the
Supreme Court "buster," should have received so little attention in the review
of this vital national problem. Perhaps, it was because in the light of his
constructive contributions, to a New Dealer, this episode reflects little credit
upon the quality of his statescraft. Quite clearly, Roosevelt had a glorious
opportunity to initiate the reform of judicial review which the author advocates.
Then "nine old men" would no longer have "judicial delusions of grandeur."
But even the author's faith in the reform is a fence-straddling faith: "But such
a transformed system, like any system of perfect censorship, would really have
little reason for existence; it would amount in effect to an abdication of
37
function."
The author favors strongly the administrative process, to which Workmen's
Compensation gave an impulse nearly more than a quarter of a century
ago. 38 "From its very birth, administrative law has been regarded by lawyers
as an illegitimate child." 3 9 Administrative agencies have almost completely
destroyed the litigious equation. In this new realm, the lawyer moves in an
alien world. The legal orgy still prevails, however, in a murder trial and
even in an action for breach of contract. 40
Systematization is a sign of the maturity of the law. Then there follows
speculation upon the nature of law, its cultural values and its characteristics,
33P. 323.

34p. 324.
315p. 325.

36p. 415, n. 14.
37p.

325.

40p.

340.

asp. 326.
39P. 330.
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as well as a groping for its "spirit." 41 , The "civil law" and the "common law"
divide the modern world into two cults. The worshippers of each constitute
its cult. The cult myth is clearly of Paretian quality. Doubtless, if the author
had presented this myth in its pristine aspects, the law of inheritance would
become merely the obstinate persistence of that same mental fixation which
resulted in the burial of the dead man's- property with its owner in primitive
times. The deceased's "estate" would be merely the endurance of the crude
sentiment of "collectivity" which the unenlightened cult of private property still
champions. The object of the author's attack seems to be to expose the
intellectual serfdom of all cults.
"The cult of the legal system is intended, of course, not only to provide
spiritual consolation and edification for the jurist, who so often is compelled to deal with the commonplace, but to conceal injustices and to help
in the obfuscation of the layman, who may possibly understand a given
legal rule but surrenders completely when he is told that no legal rule can
be understood apart from the traditions and 'spirit' of an 'organic' legal
'system' of which it is only an insignificant part. The very terms 'common
'42
law' and 'civil law' assist the prevailing obscurantism.
The author reveals that the cultists of one system rarely read the works of
4
another system. He thinks that it might be a source of discomfiture to them. 3
Contrast with this irritating vanity, the balanced excellence of Pound's historical perspective:
"History of a system of law is largely a history of borrowings of legal
materials from other legal systems and of assimilation of materials from
outside the law."
Yet the author nominates for membership to the common law cult two masters,
Sir Frederick Pollock and Dean Roscoe Pound.
The linguistic deficiencies of the author are manifest when he says that
the cult is "intended to provide spiritual consolation" and "to conceal injustices." To whomn does the author's roving imagination attribute that
mythical intent? To the deliberate design of Pound and of Pollock? The
reader's curiosity is stimulated when he learns that, "The disciples of Pollock
and Pound sometimes exceed both in poetical extravagance and fancy." But
the lines following this oracular revelation will fairly assure the reader that
the author is merely suffering from Marxian myopia, despite his legal
learning.
152.
"There are devotees of the cult of the common law who regard Parliament, which is
a representative assembly, as a nearly unique creation of British national genius." P.
398, n. 67.
42p. 153.
43p. 155. Cf. POUND, THE FORmATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAw (1938) 94.
41p.

548
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"Even earlier the 'spirit' of the Roman law had been apostrophized by
the great German jurist, Rudolf von Jhering, who also has had many
followers, although, unlike Pollock and Pound, as his work progressed
through its various volumes, he realized the futility of his undertaking and
abandoned it. He not only insisted upon the importance of considering the
purpose of legal institutions rather than their logical symmetry but
satirized mordantly what he called 'The Heaven of Juristic Concepts."
The chief representative of the Germanists has been another German
jurist, the illustrious Otto von Gierke, who has waged unending war
on all the wicked Romanists and has sought to penetrate the mysteries
of the Germanic legal 'spirit' in all its dark and romantic manifestations.""
As a disciple of the economic interpretation of history,4 5 classically expounded as a Marxian struggle of classes, it would be interesting to have the
author reveal what it was that gave to the United States the "spirit" which
converted thirteen colonies into a representative democracy, which perhaps
is the most unique social fact of modern history. If the "spirit" of our law
from Magna Carta to the middle of the twentieth century is but a myth in all
its romantic manifestations, the author should explain why this nation has
developed a social solidarity not yet undermined through law by its economic
royalists. If the common law which has flourished has not safeguarded the
liberties of our people, but is merely an economic struggle in which the
dominant class dictates the law, how does it happen that in the last few years
this nation has been the haven of European refugees, in a period of unemployment, when they merely added to the number of alien competitors of the unemployed class in their centuries-old fight against a few economic bourbons?
What "spirit" was this? How did it happen that that "spirit" did not find
expression in the law of this nation? It, too, must be a Paretian myth, a
delusion from which our people have been suffering.
In republican Athens and Rome, the only scheme for mitigating the arbitrariness of the criminal law was a procedural device of popular appeal or trial. 46
In the United States, the quintessence of judicial review was merely a legal
disguise for a political process in legal form. 47 The cult of the common law
developed it.48 Then came the myth: "A nobility of the robe was established
on the foundations of popular sovereignty," and the "government of laws"
44

45 P. 156.

"Smith set in motion the economic interpretation of the American constitution.*

*

The result of this constitution worship was a highly uncritical and static constitutional
logomachy. * * * Smith was the first to demonstrate that the constitution was actually
a 'reactionary document.'"

240.
47p. 301.
46p.

48P. 304.

Seagle, Smith, James Allen, 14 ENcYc. Soc. Scr. 116 (1934).

1942]

MYTHS, L.EGAL AND NON-LEGAL

became a "government of lawyers." "The government of the United States
became a primitive gerontocracy-a government of nine old men. The old
men of the Supreme Court have become the guardians of a mysterious essence
known as 'constitutionality,' which is the wayside bloom of legality."'4 9 Today
that is the Paretian plight in which we find ourselves.
If the reader were to sample the five page conclusion of this volume, he
probably would not venture further. Even mythology may nauseate one."0
A favorite but staling trick of the author is to attempt to renovate a well-established principle of law into a shocking novelty. Jhering, Holmes, and Pound
gave currency to the realistic approach to law as advocates of the principle:
"The life of the law lies in its application." The ill-conceived cleverness
of the author converts the observation into "The litigious equation is the life
of law." The idea is scarcely novel. The Germanic belligerency of Jhering
Note the classic
gave vigorious expression to that idea seventy years ago.,,
brevity of the author's language: "The judicial duel becomes the measure
of the constitution. 6 2 No semanticist is likely to classify these creations as
symbols of art, however, unless his judgment is largely dependent upon the
emotive quality of language. At the author's hand, the nationalism of John
Marshall becomes almost negative ;53 but he finds him "peculiarily qualified"
for the devious role of statescraft which judicial review entailed. 4 The
author engages briefly in the popular sport of rescuing Roger Brooke Taney
from the realm of myth.5 5 The sole question which will confront most readers
of this volume is whether the author doesn't create more myths than he
destroys.
Any critic could find much to praise in The Quest for Law. Th table of
contents reveals a range of vision that commends the book. The execution
of it must have involved considerable time and notable industry. Fifty pages
of notesP0 disclose a wealth of material in the social sciences, ranging from
ancient times to Thurman Arnold. Doubtless, as one professor says, it is
"the distillation of years of study and research," but the excellence of no book
49p. 314.
60
Even scholarship may become a barren myth.

"The divergence between law and

morality is naturally most marked when the law actually encourages immorality." P. 8.
The author's "learned" footnote on this observation is "One of the few jurists who admit

this lamentable fact is Sir William Markby. 'It is hence obvious,' he writes, 'that a moral
and legal right are so far from being identical that they may easily be opposed to one
another' (ELEMENTS OF LAW, 4th ed., § 12)." P. 375, n. 19.
51THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW (Tr. from 5th German ed., 1879, 1915) xii, xliii.
52p. 302.
53p. 311.

64p. 310..
55P.
312.
5

(Pp. 375-426.
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can depend solely upon those two criteria. The reader of this book will
realize that "It is easy to scoff and be superior and cynical." As propaganda,
one might rate The Quest for Law rather highly; as legal literature, the level
of its discourse too often plumbs the depths of that banality which ex~ited the
myth of the "nine old men." The oldest among the nine old men, it must be
remembered, were Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis. Its illdigested learning will probably condemn The Quest for Law to a place in
legal literature little above "Woe Unto You, Lawyers !".

